Comments due by Nov. 1, 2014
“It’s complicated.” No, that’s not Jean Tirole’s relationship status. Rather,
it’s the conclusion of his research program into how best to regulate market
competition. It earned him this year’s Nobel in economics.
Mr. Tirole is a French economic theorist whose work is central to the
work of the Federal Trade Commission and similar regulators around the
world who have been given the task of ensuring that commerce is not overly
distorted by the exercise of market power. The issues are complex and
subtle, as competition policy affects not only the prices that are set, but also
the incentives to produce more, to invest (or overinvest) and to merge.
The online chatter among my economist friends today has been entirely
enthusiastic about Mr. Tirole’s prize. The consensus is that he represents
the very best of economics. He tackles big problems, he develops new tools
when they’re needed, and his research is always grounded in the real world.
While Mr. Tirole’s work is abstract, in the sense that it involves
mathematical modeling of the likely responses of firms, suppliers,
customers and regulators to one another, it is also very much grounded in a
subtle understanding of the specific markets he has studied. Mr. Tirole’s
scholarship is not about extolling the elegant simplicity of an all-knowing,
omnipotent invisible hand that always finds the best possible outcome.
Rather, his research explores the messier reality in which markets are
populated by monopolists seeking to exploit their market power,
entrepreneurs trying to fool regulators, and regulators whose choices are
constrained by imperfect information, political constraints and their own
human foibles.
This is a research program that has both won enormous acclaim within
the academy — Mr. Tirole has long been a favorite among academic
economists to one day win the Nobel — and has had a profound impact on
public policy. As Joshua Gans, a University of Toronto economist, wrote this
morning, Mr. Tirole’s “work on regulation has influenced virtually all price
and nonprice regulation of firms with market power for two decades.”
While the previous generation of economists had been engaged in the
search for very simple rules that could apply to the regulation of all markets,
Mr. Tirole has shown that the right rule for protecting the public interest
depends critically on the details of a market.
For instance, when regulators link the prices that firms are allowed to
charge to their costs, it may be harmful because it limits their incentive to
find innovative ways to cut costs. But there may be an offsetting benefit if it
blunts the incentives for those firms to cut costs by reducing quality. This
offsetting quality effect is an important consideration when customers can’t
judge quality for themselves, but should be ignored when customers can
figure out the quality of a good before buying it.
In another example, regulators had historically not been overly worried
about monopolists embedded in a production chain. Their view was that
competition among such monopolists’ suppliers or customers would prevent
them from further exploiting their monopoly power in the next link of the
production chain. But in some cases, a monopolist may actually disrupt
competition at the next stage. For instance, the inventor of a cost-saving
innovation might garner a bigger profit by selling the new idea to just one
firm rather than 10. Effectively, that single customer is buying the right to
monopolize the next stage of the market, and so is willing to pay more than
10 times the competitive price for the innovation. Of course, it’s willing to
do this only if it can be guaranteed that it will be the only buyer given access
to that innovation.
To take another case, an earlier rule of thumb had suggested that
regulators should always be suspicious of firms that set their price below
their marginal cost, because they’re probably just trying to drive
competitors out of the market. But many newspapers are given away for
free, and none of them seem like future media monopolists. Rather, the
newspapers are given away in an effort to increase circulation, which in turn
increases advertising revenue.
The new economy has also provided fertile territory for Mr. Tirole. The
development of new platforms, such as video game platforms like the Xbox
or Sony PlayStation, provide a layer of complexity not present in most
markets, because gamers need games, and game developers need gamers.
Similar issues arise whenever the behavior of buyers depends on that of
sellers, and vice versa, such as in the markets for credit cards, social media
and search engines.
Given his interests in understanding linkages within and between
markets, it’s little surprise that Mr. Tirole has turned his attention to
understanding the appropriate regulatory response to the
interconnectedness of the financial system.
The conclusions of Mr. Tirole’s style of analysis defy easy political
characterization. In some cases they may call for a more vigorous regulatory
response from government policy makers than is currently the norm, while
in others, they call for greater restraint. In each case, the recommended
policy depends on the details of the particular market, and in particular on
what information is available; what contracts can be written; and how
competitors, suppliers and customers are likely to respond.
In turn, this shows just how much Mr. Tirole’s work is a sophisticated
mash-up of the three recent Nobel-winning themes that have revolutionized
microeconomic theory. His research extends and applies the tools of game
theory, which is used to analyze strategic interactions between firms and
their competitors, suppliers, customers and regulators. It takes seriously the
problem of imperfect information, analyzing how these interactions are
shaped by what each of these players knows about the others. And he has
been a pioneer within contract theory, assessing the consequences of the
difficulty of writing contracts that fully specify the consequences of
commercial transactions. This prize represents a vote of confidence in the
direction of modern microeconomic theory.
While we economists applaud Mr. Tirole for having pushed back the
frontiers of knowledge, all of us should also be grateful that we live
somewhat better lives in part because of his role in creating policies that
better direct market forces toward serving the public good. And that’s not so
complicated a desire.
(Justin Wolfers is a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for Internat)